Morality, Development, and Culture

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Abstract

Morality and cultural identity emerge during human development in complex ways. We describe the theories and findings that focus on social exclusion and inclusion, social inequalities such as resource allocation inequalities, and intercultural contexts that both bear on and contribute to morality and moral development. This research reveals that individuals view morality as pertaining to fair, just, and equitable interindividual treatment, while cultural identities—reflected in the messages and ideologies conveyed by larger groups to their members—are shared norms constructed by individuals to organize social groups. Findings also show that applying morality to intergroup contexts involves unique challenges not always present in intragroup situations. Biases and stereotypical expectations emerging during early development often pose obstacles to children negotiating complex moral contexts. These challenges have been investigated from a social cognitive developmental perspective, charting the contexts in which children confront such situations. The application of morality to everyday social encounters is also considered.

Keywords: morality, culture, moral reasoning, social cognitive, children, developmental theory, social exclusion, social inequalities, resource allocation, intergroup attitudes

I. INTRODUCTION

The relationship between morality and culture has been conceptualized in many different ways by psychologists, social scientists, and philosophers.
These conceptualizations reflect different definitions of morality and of culture as well as different perspectives on the extent to which morality is defined by or is independent of cultural norms. In our research we have defined morality as a set of principles regarding fairness, equality, and justice that are held by individuals. This definition stems from the work of several philosophers, including Gewirth (1978), Rawls (1971), and Sen (2009). Although classic philosophical theories of morality have rarely focused specifically on culture, we take the perspective that culture is central to the development of morality (see Turiel, 2002; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987). From our theoretical perspective, though, culture is not defined by morality, it is relevant for the ways in which individuals evaluate morally salient decisions, how moral conflicts are resolved, and how messages about social groups that bear on the application of morality in intercultural contexts are transmitted and perpetuated.

Culture is not monolithic but plural. Throughout child development, culture includes local groups that organize themselves around a set of traditions. For example, children’s peer groups share rituals that organize their groups; they hold a set of norms that are used to define their groups; and they gain satisfaction from having a group affiliation. Culture also includes identification with social groups, such as nationality, religion, and ethnicity. These groups also share rituals and norms and provide a sense of community. Norms and traditions are general categories, often including expectations about psychological constructs, which bear on morality, such as autonomy, individuality, conventions, customs, and beliefs.

It is essential to recognize and understand these multiple levels of culture in order to determine the relationship between morality and culture, because what makes this relationship complex is that most individuals are members of more than one cultural group. In some cultural contexts, children’s friendships reflect fluidity in their membership, with movement in and out of groups over time; for other cultural groups, this fluidity is more difficult. Further, for certain group membership categories, like gender or ethnicity, little movement exists as identification is bounded by biology and physical appearance.

Thus each individual belongs to multiple groups that operate on different levels of affiliation, attachment, and meaningfulness, from the local level (e.g., peer groups) to the global level (e.g., nationality, religion). Additionally, these levels of affiliation change across the life span as individuals experience
different degrees of relative salience for their various group memberships, as they receive different forms of social communication about group affiliation, and as the sociopolitical context changes (e.g., Yip, 2014). How individuals, beginning in childhood, respond to these vastly different sources of input has been a central focus of our research. Our work investigates the origins of prejudice, social exclusion, and intergroup bias, which are sources of fundamental conflicts between morality and culture. One goal of this chapter is to identify the sources of conflict that emerge between children’s and adolescents’ developing morality and their relationships with cultural groups on the local and larger level.

Our developmental approach to studying morality and culture focuses on investigating the origins, nature of change, acquisition, and sources of influence on social and moral judgments and reasoning across the life span. This approach provides an account of how children apply moral concepts to a range of social group contexts that involve morally relevant concerns, including social exclusion and social inequalities such as those pertaining to resource distribution between groups. Our research has been conducted in a number of cultural contexts and, as described further on, has specifically addressed how culture bears on the developmental processes of moral cognition, shared norms, and group identity (for a review see Hitti, Mulvey, & Killen, 2011). From early childhood to adulthood, individuals’ identification and affiliation with groups and cultures changes over time. These different levels of group affiliation must be included in examining the role that culture plays in the development of morality and how this process evolves across the life span.

A definition of culture that includes group identity and intergroup attitudes is essential, because group affiliation is the foundation for the emergence of culture in development (Killen, McGlothlin, & Lee-Kim, 2002). The tensions that arise between culture and morality emerge during childhood. Specifically, we discuss (1) our developmental approach to how children negotiate conflicts between in-group and out-group norms and moral principles; (2) how these complex social situations contribute to decisions about the inclusion and exclusion of peers; (3) how children make judgments about social inequalities across group and cultural contexts; (4) how intercultural and intergroup bias and prejudice can be reduced; and (5) future directions for research in this area. We conclude with the implications and reflections of our research program for the topics of morality, development, and culture.
II. DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY AND BACKGROUND

The theoretical foundation for our research is derived from both developmental psychology and social psychology. This section discusses three key theories used in our research program and their applications to our investigations of morality, social groups, and culture in the context of intergroup relationships. We have applied our integrative developmental model (discussed in the following paragraphs) to elucidate social exclusion, prejudice, intergroup attitudes, and social inequalities in resource allocation.

1. Social Domain Theory

We work from a social cognitive developmental model referred to as social domain theory, which provides a framework for investigating social and moral judgments and reasoning regarding social events and interactions (Killen & Cooley, 2014; Helwig, Ruck, & Peterson-Badali, 2014; Nucci, 2001; Smetana, Jambon, & Ball, 2014; Turiel, 1983, 2002; Wainryb & Recchia, 2014). The empirical research program stemming from this framework was originally designed to document whether children, adolescents, and adults evaluate social events and interactions using different domains of knowledge: (1) the moral domain (including justice, others’ welfare, and rights); (2) the societal domain (including conventions, customs, and traditions); and (3) the psychological domain (including personal choice and autonomy). According to this theory, the moral domain comprises prescriptive rules regarding how individuals ought to treat one another, the societal domain comprises behavioral regulations designed to promote the smooth functioning of social groups, and the psychological domain comprises individual prerogatives and choices that are not regulated by society.

Robust findings from over 35 years of empirical research using the social domain approach, have revealed: (1) that children, adolescents, and adults draw on these domains of knowledge to evaluate and reason about social events; (2) that contrary to earlier propositions about conceptual development occurring in broad, stage-like structures that change with each new period of development, different domains of knowledge coexist from early childhood onward; (3) that moral concepts, such as fairness and equality, emerge in early childhood, not adolescence; and (4) that the acquisition of morality, societal concepts, and psychological autonomy is constructed by children through peer- and adult-child interaction and exchanges, not through passive imitation or modeling by parents and adults.
During the 1980s, significant changes in theoretical formulations of human development across many areas of developmental psychology resulted in a progression of research away from domain-general (stage) approaches and toward domain-specific (coexisting orientations) theories of development (for review see Lapsley & Carlo, 2014). Children do not use only one general scheme (or structure) for interpreting the world, nor does this (one) scheme change in abrupt qualitative shifts from one stage of development to the next. This was found to be the case in cognitive development (Keil, 2006; Kuhn & Siegler, 2006) as well as social development (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 2006). In fact, individuals’ judgments about social interactions were often grounded in contextual variables. For example, when evaluating rule transgressions children gave explanations about why hitting someone was wrong using moral reasons related to equality and fair treatment of others, but gave conventional reasons regarding customs and traditions for why eating spaghetti with one’s fingers was wrong. The coexistence of both types of reasoning at an early age negated the expectation that a child could be in a “conventional” stage prior to a “moral” stage of development.

The most surprising findings uncovered by early studies based on social domain theory pertained to the young age at which children were able to weigh and coordinate different forms of reasoning in evaluating a social situation, making a decision, or judging what action to take in a given situation. Contrary to popular theories at the time, research demonstrated that young children are not wholly selfish, egotistic, or aggressive. Instead, children as young as three or four years of age reason about fairness, willingly cooperate, and display overt prosocial orientations (Eisenberg, Spinard, & Morris, 2014; Smetana, et al., 2014; Vaish & Tomasello, 2014). Social domain theory provided an alternative to Kohlberg’s (1969) moral stage theory, in which a hierarchical sequence was proposed that charted changes in moral reasoning from childhood to adulthood. Extensive research has demonstrated that young children are not solely punishment-oriented or adolescents strictly focused on conventions, as predicted by Kohlberg’s theory (see Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 2002).

To study culture and morality, social domain researchers have examined the use of these moral, societal, and psychological domains of knowledge across a wide range of cultural groups. This research has demonstrated the universality of the existence of these three domains of knowledge. Children from environments of both low and high socioeconomic status, in rural and urban settings, and in different nations around the world have been shown
to differentiate moral rules from social-conventional ones using a strikingly similar set of criteria (for reviews, see Helwig, 2006; Turiel, 2002; Wainryb, 2006; Wainryb & Recchia, 2014). These criteria included the generalizability of a rule (rules about fairness were viewed as generalizable across contexts whereas rules about traditions were not), authority jurisdiction over a rule (fair and equal treatment was not viewed as subject to authority jurisdiction whereas conventions and traditions were), and punishment avoidance after breaking a rule (transgressions pertaining to fair and equal treatment were viewed as wrong even in the absence of punishment whereas conventional transgressions were deemed acceptable when the risk of punishment was lifted). For example, while inflicting harm for no reason (a transgression of moral norms) was deemed wrong across contexts, wrong even if an authority figure condoned it, and wrong regardless of whether the transgressor got in trouble, wearing pajamas to school (a transgression of conventional norms) was deemed acceptable in other contexts, if promoted by an authority figure, or in the absence of punishment (see Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1985).

Cross-cultural research demonstrating the generalizability of social domain theory distinctions has been extensive. Because the focus was on cross-cultural assessments of the differentiation of moral and societal domains, however, the characters depicted in research assessments as hypothetical transgressors of moral or conventional norms often reflected the same gender, race, ethnicity, and nationality as the participant. What was not known was how moral concepts and social cognitive judgments were applied to groups of varying status and that varied in salience with respect to the participants’ intergroup perspective—in other words, how children’s moral concepts were applied to contexts that were diverse in terms of cultural categories.

Thus the current research program, described in this chapter, was designed to integrate social domain theory with developmental variants of social identity theory (such as Abrams & Rutland, 2008) in order to understand how morality is applied in intergroup contexts. In these situations, the hypothetical recipients for moral treatment in research assessments reflected different group memberships defined by culture, religion, race, gender, socio-economic status, and relative status. The contexts selected for this program of research included social inclusion and exclusion, attributions of blame, and resource allocation (Killen & Rutland, 2011; Rutland, Killen & Abrams, 2010). This research requires in-depth analyses of group identity, affiliation with groups, and the results of in-group preference, which often result in prejudice and bias. Thus the current research program investigates the contexts
in which individuals apply (or fail to apply) their generalizable concepts of fairness and equality to intercultural contexts.

2. Developmental Theories of Social Identity

At an early age, children develop an understanding of the different groups that constitute their social world and begin to identify with these groups (Bennett & Sani, 2004; Ruble & Martin, 1998). These groups range from broad social categories, such as ethnicity or gender, to unique groups such as the family and temporary but significant groups such as school classmates. From the perspective of social identity theory (SIT), in-group preference is explained in terms of a process of self-categorization and identification with these group affiliations (Bennett & Sani, 2004). According to SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), individuals are motivated to make favorable evaluations based on in-group membership, and thus are more likely to have out-group biases.

SIT is not a developmental theory and does not make predictions about origins, acquisition, or age-related changes regarding social identity. Yet a group of SIT-trained researchers have formulated developmental social identity theories (Abrams & Rutland, 2008; Nesdale, 2008; Verkuyten, 2007). For instance, children bolster their sense of social identity by excluding out-group others from their social in-group (Verkuyten & Steenhuis, 2005; Nesdale, 2004), present a positive public self to their peer group (Rutland, 2004; Rutland, Cameron, Milne, & McGeorge, 2005), and exclude in-group members who deviate from group norms (discussed in detail in section III, further on).

The strength of Nesdale and colleagues’ developmental social identity theory lies in its differentiation of children’s preference for their own in-group from their potential dislike of out-groups (Nesdale, 2007, 2013; Nesdale, Durkin, Maass, & Griffiths, 2005). Children do not automatically dislike peers from out-groups. Rather, they demonstrate social acumen by using their social knowledge and social-cognitive abilities to continually monitor other children and their social interactions with peers. Whether they show out-group dislike or not will depend in part on the strength of their identification with their group, how much they feel their group is being threatened, and if they understand and believe that showing such prejudice is consistent with the expectation of their group (i.e., the in-group norm). This latter point concerning group norms is particularly relevant in considering interventions to challenge social exclusion, since research suggests that children are more
likely to show prejudice and participate in social exclusion if they think their own group condones such actions, seeing them as typical group behavior (Nesdale et al., 2005; Rutland, Cameron, Milne, & McGeorge, 2005).

Moreover, research by Rutland and colleagues (Rutland, et al., 2005) has shown that the development of social-cognitive abilities influences whether individuals show biases toward others from different groups. This research highlights the fact that attitude development is a process of active construction rather than simple “top-down” socialization or an automatic implicit cognitive or emotional process. For example, recent research has found that group norms influence children’s developing ability to control their expressions of prejudice (FitzRoy & Rutland, 2010; Rutland et al., 2005). The inhibition of discriminatory behavior requires children to acquire social knowledge and social-cognitive abilities, in particular the ability to understand other people’s mental states and their attitudes or beliefs about social relationships.

3. Developmental Subjective Group Dynamics

The developmental subjective group dynamics model (Abrams & Rutland, 2008; Abrams, Rutland, Cameron & Marques, 2003) holds that children develop a dynamic relationship between their judgments about peers within groups and about groups as a whole (i.e., intergroup attitudes). As children’s social-cognitive development changes and they experience belonging to social groups, they are more likely to integrate their preferences for different groups with their evaluations of peers within groups based on particular characteristics or behaviors (Aboud & Amato, 2001; Nesdale, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). For example, a group of children identifying as fans of a sports team may begin to change their attitudes about a member of the in-group “team” who acts like or cheers for members of a rival team (the out-group). This change in children’s social cognition means that they can often both exclude a peer because he or she is from a different social group (i.e., intergroup bias) and exclude a peer from within their group who deviates from the group’s social-conventional norms (i.e., intragroup bias), as by showing increased liking or support of an out-group member.

Research following this developmental subjective group dynamics model (Abrams et al., 2003; Abrams & Rutland, 2008) has investigated intergroup exclusion (exclusion of a non-normative in-group member from the group) and has also established an experimental paradigm to examine how children would evaluate in-group and out-group peers who either showed “normative”
behavior or “deviant” (disloyal) behavior. Studies focusing on national groups, summer school groups, and minimal or “arbitrary” groups (Abrams, Rutland, Ferrell, & Pelletier, 2008) have shown that in evaluating potential targets of exclusion, children simultaneously prefer (evaluate positively) those from other social groups who support social conventional norms central to their group and exclude those within their peer group who threaten their group norms. Studies have also shown that these different forms of social exclusion are more strongly linked among older children who are more motivated to support their in-group (i.e., show high intergroup bias or identify more strongly). One limitation of this research is that among studies that examine racial and ethnic in-groups and out-groups, much of it has focused on outcomes for ethnic majority status children (how to reduce prejudice from the majority ethnic group). As we discuss and elaborate on what follows, some of the assessments look different when including children from ethnic minority backgrounds or from lower-status groups—lower-status in terms of a given cultural hierarchy. In general these studies outline how both types of social exclusion (intergroup and intragroup) are related to the children's sense of social identity and their desire to maintain intergroup boundaries through the maintenance of group differences.

In research using developmental subjective group dynamics theory, the norms of the group must be differentiated from group membership. Thus an individual may exclude a member of his or her own group (intragroup exclusion) who does not conform to the norms. The norms in the empirical studies have usually been conventional ones (such as sports team loyalty), but our integrative research has applied the theory to moral norms as well. Thus the theory makes predictions about how individuals understand the interactions of their own groups in relation to other groups, which is a frequent source of both intergroup as well as intercultural conflict. Additionally, group dynamics provides information about group identity, and what makes an individual affiliate with a group or leave a group—behaviors that change with age throughout the life span. Finally, investigations of knowledge about group dynamics from a developmental perspective provide a new way of understanding culture.

Thus the theoretical model (described in detail further on) used to guide the research covered in this chapter reflects an integration of three empirically robust theoretical models: social domain theory (Killen & Cooley, 2014; Killen, et al., 2007), developmental subjective group dynamics (Abrams & Rutland, 2008), and social development identity theory (Nesdale, 2007,
Our social reasoning developmental model builds upon these three theoretical frameworks to investigate the intersections of morality and culture.

III. MAJOR CONCEPTS OF OUR SOCIAL REASONING DEVELOPMENTAL MODEL

Our social reasoning developmental model (Rutland et al., 2010; Killen & Rutland, 2011) provides a basis for understanding morality, culture, and intergroup attitudes. We examine both individual and group perspectives, moral and social reasoning, inclusion and exclusion, and prejudice and bias in development. We have investigated how these phenomena emerge, develop, and change from childhood to adulthood.

Traditionally psychological theories about morality have proposed that morality is either universal or culture-specific. Our research and related work indicate that this characterization reflects a false dichotomy (see also Killen & Smetana, 2015). A universal definition of morality has been characterized as one that is absolute, reflecting rigid maxims held by individuals, which does not take contextual factors into account, whereas a culturally specific definition of morality has been viewed as one in which morality varies by culture, reflecting a form of relativism. Psychological research over the past 30 years has indicated that neither of these characterizations is completely accurate, nor do these perspectives reflect the complete psychological reality of individuals living within cultures.

From our developmental perspective, moral values and principles are an important measure by which individuals evaluate other people and their actions. Moral principles and cultural norms are sometimes complementary and sometimes at odds with one another, and children and adolescents consider both as they navigate their social lives. When moral principles regarding justice and equality are in conflict with cultural traditions about how individuals regulate their interactions, children and adolescents must weigh the relative salience of both factors. These social experiences often generate much discussion and disagreement. Our research demonstrates that customs and traditions are important means for establishing group identity and arise from the varied everyday social interactions that individuals engage in from birth to adulthood, but they are often in conflict with morality.

As discussed above, at the same time that children are developing their strong sense of equality, fairness, and justice, they are also developing
affiliations with groups. These affiliations emerge early and develop into a social identity that can reflect a range of cultural group memberships. While group membership and affiliation is a positive and fundamental aspect of social life, group membership can also serve as an obstacle to morality through the processes of in-group preference, in-group bias, and out-group derogation. Stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes are clearly antithetical to the moral values of equality and fair treatment of others, whereas group identity is not. Yet, group processes, including in-group preference, can develop in adolescence and adulthood into the types of prejudice and biases that result in inequalities and unfair treatment toward others because of their group membership. These observations are evidenced by children’s preference for members of their own social group across a variety of social situations (Killen & Rutland, 2011; Rutland et al., 2010). We approach this frequent tension between morality and social groups from a developmental viewpoint in which “culture” refers both to the local peer group worlds that children create and experience and to the larger-level cultural context for development in which children have overarching affiliations, as with nationality and religion (among others).

One unique aspect of our developmental theory is that we study how peer-group and cultural identities contribute to the origins of prejudice rather than focusing on the direct input that children receive from adults. Parents are a very important source of input in children’s development, but they are not the sole source (Aboud & Amato, 2001; Nesdale, 2004; Killen & Rutland, 2011). In fact, children’s prejudicial attitudes are not a direct mirroring of parental attitudes (Aboud & Amato, 2001). While parent-child relationships and interactions are significantly related to children’s intergroup attitudes, children’s social cognitive development is also a central contributing factor to how their biases and stereotypes emerge, change, and evolve. There are times when children challenge the influence of authority and reject an authority figure’s mandates that conflict with their own moral judgments about fairness—specifically about treating others differently because of potential bias or stereotypic expectations (e.g., “Girls can play with trucks too, because there is no such thing as boy toys or girl toys!” “My mother doesn’t want me to be with people who are different but we’re friends, and sometimes you have to teach your parents to like people who have different skin color”).

Research on moral development has shown that young children develop morality as part of their social cognitive development, not as a direct
imitation of parental role models or as an outcome of direct teaching (Grusec, 2006; Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1983; Piaget, 1932). Similarly, cultural identity is not a passive process in development. Children form identification and affiliations with groups that extend beyond the categories identified by parents, and the acquisition of these cultural identities is not solely a mirroring of parental identities but one constructed by children (Wainryb & Recchia, 2014), which often includes aspects of parental values. Thus the interplay between morality and culture is one that reflects a complex social, cognitive, and developmental process.

In our research on social exclusion, inclusion, prejudice, and biases existing in peer groups, factors such as status and hierarchies are important (Appiah, 2005; Sen, 2009). Much of the developmental research on social status and social exclusion has examined hierarchies in peer groups that stem from individual social deficits, such as the inability to read social cues and the attribution of negative biases (“hostile attribution bias”), leading to bully-victim relationships (Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 2006). We have argued that while these sources of hierarchies are important to study and address, status differences based on group identity and norms do not stem solely from social cognitive deficits but also from social group processes and are necessary to understand (Killen, Mulvey, & Hitti, 2013). This is especially important because what often looks like interpersonal exclusion on the basis of personality characteristics (excluding a “shy” child) may actually be intergroup exclusion on the basis of stereotypes about group membership (excluding an Asian child because of stereotypic expectations that Asian children are shy) (see Killen et al., 2013). Although these different types of exclusion can be related, they are not equivalent in terms of children’s and adolescents’ understanding of group dynamics and group norms and in terms of their decisions in everyday social contexts. Thus we have drawn from social psychological research to understand group processes and group dynamics in childhood.

Hierarchies based on status and power both exist in many intercultural contexts and are forged out of sociohistorical contexts. Thus an individual’s position in a social hierarchy is related to his or her group orientation. Socially stigmatized by the larger society, low-status group members are considered by others to be “lesser” by some measure and to be targets for exclusion and discrimination. Conversely, as beneficiaries of power and privilege, high-status group members are less stigmatized and less likely to be discriminated against. In this way, social hierarchies serve to perpetuate systems of power and discrimination. This is an inherently moral issue: unjustified
inequity and discrimination are viewed across cultures as wrong from a moral viewpoint.

Moreover, cultures convey these attitudes about group status using both overt (explicit) and covert (implicit) modes of communication, resulting in implicit biases that are often unknown to the individual holding the bias. One person can also be faced with having to weigh or evaluate different cultural expectations from different social groups. For example, being members of multiple cultures (e.g., Danish and Muslim; Turkish and German), races (e.g., biracial and multiracial), and religions (Jewish and Catholic families) can provide individuals with opportunities to recognize the conflicts as well as the message that different groups convey. Our research program has investigated the development of both explicit judgments and implicit bias about others and the factors that reduce biases, such as exposure and contact with members of out-groups under favorable conditions (see Tropp & Prenovost, 2008).

Despite the prevalence of social exclusion in childhood, in many contexts children reject overt forms of social exclusion of peers based on group membership, even when parents or society condone it. The contexts in which children reject intergroup exclusion based on race or gender, for example, are those in which group membership is the sole reason identified for rejection. However, in more ambiguous or complex social situations and encounters, children often use stereotypic expectations about cultural groups, in-group preference, in-group bias, and conventional reasoning (explanations based on traditions or expectations) to condone exclusion and to distribute resources inequitably, favoring the self or the in-group. These findings support social psychological studies that have shown that adults also resort to stereotypic expectations in situations with ambiguity and complexity, and more so than in straightforward situations where egalitarian responses are more likely (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004).

It is important to note that there are fundamental differences between excluding someone based on group membership (e.g., in-group preference) and rejecting someone owing to individual traits, such as abilities related to group functioning (e.g., excluding the slow runner from the track team). The former behavior is connected to group identity, which is part of social development (belonging to groups); the latter behavior is connected to personality traits in some cases or personality deficits (such as excluding someone who is extremely shy or overly aggressive). Children who are rejected because of their group membership (race, gender, religion) face different consequences from those children who are excluded owing to their social deficits, which, in
extreme cases, may be reflective of developmental psychopathology (Rubin et al., 2006).

Rather than focusing on personality traits and individual differences, our research program makes predictions based on group identity and group affiliation (see Abrams, Hogg, & Marques, 2005; Cooley, Elenbaas, & Killen, 2012; Killen et al., 2013). In the next section, we describe a program of research that has been guided by developmental and social psychological research on social exclusion.

**IV. SOCIAL EXCLUSION: THEORY AND RESEARCH**

Social exclusion is common and occurs for many different reasons (Killen et al., 2006; Recchia, Brehl, & Wainryb, 2012). In fact there are contexts in which most individuals condone exclusion, as when the criteria for inclusion are established and agreed upon by the participants without a clear violation of fairness principles. For example, individuals are excluded from jobs if they lack essential qualifications or from college if they lack good grades and from sports if they are not athletically trained. Because there are many contexts in which exclusion is viewed as legitimate, understanding what makes some types of exclusion wrong, as when it stems from prejudice or bias, is often difficult and complex. This is the central rationale for investigating different forms of reasoning about exclusion as well as for determining the criteria that contribute to the contexts in which exclusion is unfair (and, conversely, those in which it is viewed as legitimate to maintain group functioning).

We argue that differences in evaluation and interpretation can lead one individual to justify exclusion for conventional reasons (focusing on maintaining smooth group functioning) and another individual may reject exclusion in the same context for moral reasons (focusing on unfairness). As an illustration, if a runner is excluded from the competitive track team citing slow performance, this would most likely be viewed as legitimate form of exclusion from a conventional perspective, given that teams do not achieve their goals if the athletes are not talented. However, it might also be the case that the athlete is a member of an out-group—for example, Muslim in a Christian community—and runs just as fast as another Christian athlete who was not excluded. The latter scenario may be viewed as unfair because the criterion of religious group membership is not related to athletic abilities. Pulling apart these different reasons and motivations, especially in childhood, reveals one
of the challenges associated with morality and culture. Investigation of this issue provides the basis for addressing the pervasiveness of social exclusion based on group membership. Given that children are both the recipients of unfair treatment as well as its perpetrators, it is necessary to understand this phenomenon from multiple perspectives.

Social exclusion based on gender, race, ethnicity, and culture has been widely documented in cultures and nations around the world (Killen et al., 2011). For example, 25% of adolescents in Spain and England reported experiencing social exclusion for personal or cultural reasons, with adolescents from cultural minority groups reporting higher levels of social exclusion and name calling on the basis of group membership than adolescents from cultural majority groups. In fact, more than one third of students from cultural minority groups in these two countries reported experiencing name calling because of cultural differences, and one eighth reported overt experiences of social exclusion related to cultural status (Monks, Ortega-Ruiz, & Rodriguez-Hidalgo, 2008).

In the British context, Hindu, Indian Muslim, and Pakistani children living in England reported widespread bullying; over the course of only one school term, 57% of boys and 43% of girls reported being bullied at least once. The most frequent reasons for bullying were related to cultural norms, religious practices (gods worshiped), name and place of worship (for Hindus), clothing and accessories (for Indian Muslims), and language, food, and clothing (for Pakistanis) (Eslea & Mukhtar, 2000). Similarly, in Finland, immigrants from the neighboring countries of Russia, Estonia, and Sweden suffer from discrimination on the basis of race. Nine- to twelve-year-old first- and second-generation Russian-speaking preadolescents in Finland report higher levels of racist victimization, including social rejection, than native Finnish youth, and second-generation immigrants report higher levels of property damage, threats, and cybervictimization (Strohmeier, Kärnä, & Salmivalli, 2011). Peer rejection and exclusion have also been documented in the United States, where about 26% children have been shown to experience exclusion (Wang, Iannotti, Luk, & Nansel, 2010).

Given the complexity of exclusion occurring in an intergroup setting, our investigations of social exclusion have involved testing whether children and adolescents differentiate interpersonal exclusion from intergroup exclusion. Additionally, we have examined when stereotypic expectations become obstacles for recognizing that intergroup exclusion may be unfair, and how children’s knowledge about group dynamics is related to their evaluations of social inclusion and exclusion.
1. Children’s Evaluations of Interpersonal and Intergroup Exclusion

Research has shown that children and adolescents differentiate between interpersonal exclusion and exclusion based on group affiliation (e.g., gender, race, sexual identity), in judging the legitimacy of exclusion. In a series of studies, children in different countries (Japan, Korea, Switzerland, and the United States) were asked to evaluation exclusion based on interpersonal traits such as shyness and exclusion based on intergroup variables such as gender, nationality, and culture (for a review, see Hitti, Mulvey, & Killen, 2011). Overall, children viewed intergroup exclusion to be unfair, whereas interpersonal exclusion reflected more variability in judgments. For example, in contexts where one’s personality or individual traits were dissimilar to the peer group’s expectations for behavior, children often supported exclusion.

One such study, by Park and Killen (2010), investigated American and Korean 10- and 13-year-old’s judgments and reasoning about peer rejection and peer victimization based on individual characteristics, such as shyness and aggressiveness, as well as group membership characteristics, such as gender and nationality. Results indicated that both Korean and American children and adolescents thought it more justifiable to exclude those with aggressive personalities than people who were shy or of a different gender or nationality. In fact children in both samples thought that it was less justifiable to exclude or reject others because of group-based characteristics (gender and nationality) than individual trait characteristics (either shy or aggressive). The main cross-cultural difference showed that American participants were more willing to exclude an aggressive person than Korean participants, but Korean participants were more willing to exclude someone from a different nationality. These cultural differences can be attributed to (1) American children’s exposure to violence through the media and entrenched school norms that condemn bullying and aggression, (2) Korean children’s lack of contact or interaction with other children from different countries, which is known to increase acceptance of out-group members (Tropp & Prenovost, 2008), and (3) cultural ideologies regarding personality trait expectations and ethnocentrism (Gelfand, Raver, Nishii, Leslie, Lun et al., 2011).

Furthermore, this same study revealed that 10- and 13-year-old Korean and American children evaluated acts of peer victimization as more wrong than acts of peer rejection from interpersonal friendship. Both American and Korean participants found it more justifiable to reject or exclude someone from a friendship because of personality traits such as shyness and
aggressiveness and referenced reasons of personal choice to make decisions about interpersonal friendships. These judgments contrast with children’s overwhelming use of moral reasoning pertaining to fairness in judging it wrong to reject or exclude someone based on gender or nationality. This study highlighted many similarities between Korean and American 10- and 13-year-olds when peer rejection and peer victimization were being assessed but it also documented some context-specific differences based on a peer’s traits.

Similar studies in other cultural contexts have revealed parallel findings. In Switzerland, for example, Malti et al. (2012) examined exclusion decisions of 12- and 15-year-old Swiss and Serbian immigrant adolescents. Adolescents were interviewed about the hypothetical exclusion of a peer from a group activity on the basis of nationality (Swiss or Serbian), gender, or personality traits (shyness). Overall, exclusion based on nationality was deemed less acceptable than exclusion based on gender or personality. Additionally, it was deemed more wrong for a parent to condone exclusion on the basis of nationality than on the basis of gender. Interestingly, participants who were recent immigrants viewed exclusion on the basis of nationality to be more wrong than did native Swiss adolescents and attributed more positive emotions to the Swiss excluder across all contexts. Recent Swiss immigrant adolescents (from Serbia) attributed positive emotions to the excluders (who were from the majority group, comprising Swiss nationals) because they expected that the Swiss national peers would be “pleased” to be with only other Swiss national students, not recent immigrants. These findings highlight the effects of group status on adolescents’ evaluations of social exclusion.

In another cross-national study, Japanese and American 9-, 12- and 15-year-olds were asked to judge the exclusion of an atypical peer from a group activity in six different contexts (e.g., excluding peers who dye their hair green and wear unusual clothing from going to a fancy restaurant, excluding someone who acts lonely or sad from going to a picnic, or excluding someone who acts like a clown from going to the movies) (Killen, Crystal, & Watanabe, 2002). No main difference between American and Japanese cultures were found for judging exclusion of an atypical peer, but Japanese participants were more accepting of exclusion in two specific contexts: (1) when excluding peers who dye their hair owing to the violation of convention and (2) when excluding a sad peer owing to an expectation that sad persons would not want to join the group. These reasons stemmed from Japanese students’ interpretations of what contexts are legitimate for the potential exclusion of peers.
Children’s and adolescents’ prescriptions to conformity (i.e., “Should atypical peers change their behavior?”) showed interesting cultural differences. With age, Japanese participants expected aggressive peers to change their behavior, but American participants’ expectations for change decreased with age. This decrease in the expectation by age among American children, corresponds with an increase in the expectation of autonomy—that is, adolescents believe that one does not have to change one’s behavior to conform to the group. In addition, American participants expected those who were inadequate sports players to conform to the group’s need for a good athlete more than did the Japanese participants. Thus the findings revealed a coexistence of orientations within culture; conformity mattered to both groups but for different contexts. Further empirical investigation is required to determine which issues generated conformity expectations.

In a follow-up to the study just described, Park, Killen, Crystal, and Watanabe (2003) surveyed 9-, 12-, and 15-year-old Korean children and compared their judgments about the exclusion of atypical peers and their prescriptions for conformity with those of their American and Japanese counterparts previously surveyed (Killen, Crystal, et al., 2002). Overall, Korean children and adolescents found the exclusion of an atypical peer to be less acceptable than did both American and Japanese participants. However, some context-specific findings indicated that Koreans were similar to both American and Japanese children in their exclusion judgments about an aggressive peer, but they agreed with the exclusion of a peer who acted like a clown more than did their American and Japanese counterparts. Additionally, Koreans prescribed more conformity on behalf of the atypical peers than did American and Japanese children and adolescents across all six scenarios presented. One of the outcomes of this study was to show that the psychological judgments demonstrated by these cultural comparisons did not fit into a dichotomous cultural template of individualism or collectivism for Asian versus western cultures, given that Korean and Japanese cultures are both nonwestern Asian cultures (and adolescents within these two countries evaluated peer interactions differently). In general, the finding provided evidence of heterogeneity among individuals in cultures traditionally thought to have either “collectivistic” or “individualistic” orientations and specifically for the social exclusion of atypical peers.

In addition to differences between countries, gender and age also played a role in how participants evaluated atypical peers in these studies. Japanese and American participants showed a similar gender pattern: females were
less accepting of exclusion and were less willing to conform than males. This
gender difference, however, was greater for Americans. No gender differences
were found among Korean participants. Conformity ratings for all partici-
pants decreased with age, emphasizing importance of autonomy judgments
for adolescents across the cultures and nationalities represented in this sam-
ple. In sum, these studies revealed that in judging exclusion of atypical peers,
the context for exclusion is a stronger predictor of children’s and adolescents’
judgments than nationality. Social context matters because each situation
has multiple factors that require evaluation and examination; the confluence
of different variables for individuals to weigh generates different forms of
decision making and priority given to each consideration. In some contexts
these priorities are independent of cultural norms (e.g., evaluating aggressive
peers) and in others they are not (e.g., evaluating sad and clownish peers and
those lacking in sports ability).

In a related study investigating American and Japanese reactions to phys-
ical deviance (e.g., obesity and facial scarring) (Crystal, Watanabe, & Chen,
2000) in a peer group setting, both 10- and 16-year-old American partici-
pants rejected other people’s negative opinions and the stigma they associated
with such deviance. Cultural differences emerged regarding the reactions to
the expression of stigma from peers. American participants ignored others’
negative viewpoints, alluding to notions of equality and rejecting the stig-
matization. Japanese participants, on the other hand, expressed a desire to
conform to the peer group and made efforts to minimize the physical dif-
fences. Age-related trends were also found, showing that the cultural dif-
fferences were more pronounced for the younger participants; by adolescence
both Japanese and Americans expressed a rejection of other’s biased opin-
ions, highlighting the importance of equality and the promotion of autonomy
during this developmental period.

Studies of interpersonal and intergroup exclusion in Australia (Nesdale &
Brown, 2004; Nesdale, Lawson, Durkin, & Duffy, 2010) have shown that in
considering information about individual behavior (e.g., mean, friendly) in
conjunction with information about group membership (i.e., Anglo-Australian
in-group, Chinese out-group), 6-, 9-, and 12-year-old Anglo-Australians
reported disliking atypical in-group members and liking atypical out-group
members, and this pattern of preferences increased with age. This was
because while deviant in-group members were viewed negatively due to their
disloyalty, deviant out-group members exhibiting disloyalty were not per-
ceived as a threat to participants’ in-group identity and therefore were not
evaluated negatively. These findings indicated that individual traits matter in an intergroup context when these traits disrupt the coherence of the group, specifically the in-group.

Studies of children’s and adolescents’ evaluations of racial exclusion in the United States have examined the level of intimacy of the social exclusion context as a factor in decisions to exclude an out-group peer from an activity. A series of studies by Killen, Crystal, and Ruck (Crystal, Killen, & Ruck, 2008; Killen, et al., 2007; Ruck, Park, Killen, & Crystal, 2011), examined racial and ethnic minority and majority 9-, 13-, and 15-year-old children and adolescents’ evaluations of interracial exclusion. Participants evaluated vignettes where a White, European American peer (racial majority group) excluded a Black, African American peer (racial minority group) from one of three contexts: a lunch table at school, a birthday party sleepover at home, and a school dance. The findings revealed that the level of intimacy was related to how majority participants but not minority participants rated exclusion. Racial and ethnic majority participants were more likely to justify exclusion in intimate contexts (that is, to deem it acceptable).

As shown in Figure 4-1, when asked for their judgment given that the reason for exclusion was race-based, the majority (but not all) of the participants judged it wrong in the sleepover context. However, when asked if the reason for exclusion was non-race-related, such as “parental discomfort at a new peer staying over at the home,” participants were more likely to view it

![Figure 4-1: Wrongfulness of exclusion ratings (1 = very good; 8 = very bad) of how good or bad it is for a White child to exclude a Black child from a sleepover birthday party due to “Race” or “Parental Discomfort.” (Adapted from Killen, M., Henning, A., Kelly, M. C., Crystal, D., & Ruck, M. [2007]. Evaluations of interracial peer encounters by majority and minority US children and adolescents. *International Journal of Behavioral Development*, 31, 491–500.)*](#)
as legitimate. Participants’ reasoning for their evaluations revealed very different outlooks on these rationales for exclusion. Whereas some participants stated that it would be acceptable not to invite a Black child to a sleepover because the parents would be uncomfortable with someone new at the house, racial and ethnic minority participants frequently stated that the reason was not legitimate and the action would be wrong (e.g., “It’s wrong because the friend might think it’s about race, and why would the parents be uncomfortable? It’s probably about race and you have to teach your parents that racism is wrong, and that your friend is just as nice as the other kids.”).

As mentioned earlier, the developmental literature on peer rejection in childhood (e.g., bullying and victimization) has often suggested that victims of exclusion invite rejection by their peers because of specific individual traits, such as shyness or aggressiveness (Rubin et al., 2006). While assessing individual characteristics is important, this approach often ignores the stereotypic information related to the victim’s social group membership that excluders may attribute to an individual (Killen, Mulvey, & Hitti, 2013). In the following section we will highlight some key empirical studies that have demonstrated children and adolescents’ levels of vulnerability to stereotypic expectations about social categories.

2. Stereotypic Expectations and Social Exclusion

To examine how stereotypic expectations about gender and race were related to children’s and adolescents’ evaluations of exclusion, Killen, Lee-Kim, McGlothlin, and Stangor (2002) conducted an in-depth study (N = 294) of how children and adolescents at 10, 13, and 15 years of age evenly divided by four ethnic groups (European-American, African-American, Asian-American, and Latino) evaluated and reasoned about three contexts for gender and racial exclusion: friendship, peer group, and school institutions. The general methodology involved assessments of judgments and reasoning about familiar everyday events in the world of peers. Scenarios were described based on pilot observations at school that reflected intergroup exclusion contexts.

Each scenario involved race- or gender-based exclusion by a high-status peer (European American or boy) of a low-status peer (African American or girl). Examples were of a peer who does not want to be friends with a new peer in the neighborhood because of his or her race or gender, of a group that excludes a peer from joining their music club because of his or her race or gender, and of a school that admits only children of one race or gender.
Also measured was the degree to which social influence (parents or peers), authority expectations, and cultural generalizability were weighed by the participant.

The findings from this study indicate that gender- and race-based exclusion was viewed by both children and adolescents (10-, 13-, 16-year-olds) as not justifiable when carried out by institutions (e.g., schools) but more justifiable when it occurred in dyadic friendships and peer groups. Gender-based exclusion was viewed to be more legitimate than race-based exclusion in a peer-group context. These findings were transferrable to similar situations if they occurred in other countries with different cultural norms. With age, children were more likely to resist parental influence (to exclude) but less likely to resist peer influence. Further, ethnic majority peers were less likely to view exclusion as wrong than were ethnic minority peers for the friendship contexts.

Møller and Tenenbaum (2011) adapted the methodology of Killen et al. (2002) (described earlier) to the context of Denmark, a country that historically experienced little immigration until the 1960s, when foreign workers from Turkey, Pakistan, and the former Yugoslavia began arriving there. Later immigrants came from Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Lebanon, and the Balkans. Although Denmark is more gender-egalitarian than the United States in terms of quality of health, employment, education, income, and government representation, Muslims (a cultural minority) in Denmark experience discrimination in part because the majority of Danes embrace secularism (while also priding themselves as a nation on tolerance). In order to address these differences of opinion, 8- to 12-year-old Danish cultural majority children were interviewed using hypothetical vignettes depicting one child’s exclusion from a game by a peer or a teacher on the basis of gender or cultural minority status (Danish majority or Muslim minority).

Overall, exclusion based on ethnicity was judged to be less acceptable, for moral reasons, than exclusion based on gender, which was sometimes justified for reasons of social convention. Additionally, children deemed it less acceptable to exclude a Muslim child than a Danish majority child and less acceptable for a teacher to exclude a child than for a peer to exclude another peer, indicating that participants considered not only the act of exclusion but the characteristics of the target and excluder, taking into consideration social status and authority.

These studies highlight that, with increasing age, children become more attuned to social contextual information and factor it into their exclusion judgments. While preadolescents and adolescents continue to consider the moral dimensions of exclusion (unfairness, hurt feelings), they are also
concerned about optimal dynamics between friends and groups. Thus it is important to explore the underlying motivation for social exclusion based on group identity as well as for maintaining group functioning. If one assumes that optimal fit cannot be achieved because of one’s mere membership in a gender- or race-based group, this may be viewed as a proxy for underlying stereotypic expectations about cross-gender and cross-race interactions.

Research has been conducted to further explore this question. Expectations about how groups behave are often laden with stereotypes related to the social categories of the group. For example, individuals may expect that a group of girls would prefer to play with dolls as opposed to trucks; however, this expectation is stereotypic in nature because it assumes that all girls have this preference and does not allow for individual differences. Empirical studies have shown that these expectations are present early in childhood but can be changed. For example, Killen, Pisacane, Lee-Kim, and Ardila-Rey (2001) asked four- to six-year-olds to choose between including a child who fit the stereotypic expectations of a group participating in gender-stereotypic play or a child who did not fit the stereotype (e.g., choose a boy to play with a group of girls playing with dolls or choose a girl to join the group). Children were also counterprobed about their responses to assess the level of flexibility in their responses. Young children were more likely to include a child who fit gender stereotypic toy-playing expectations than one who did not, but this changed after they were counterprobed (e.g., “A girl in the group said that the boy should be included because he usually does not get a chance to play with dolls. Now who do you think should get to play?”). In addition, those who initially picked the nonstereotypic child were less likely to change their responses than those who picked the stereotypic child, indicating that young children’s judgments are more likely to be changed when fairness arguments are being used for inclusions (i.e., when fairness is brought up for consideration) than when conventional arguments pertaining to group “fit” are made.

Cross-sectional studies examining the same topics have shown that the use of stereotypic expectations about gender-based as well as race-based activities is present in older children as well as younger children. Killen and Stangor (2001) investigated the forms of reasoning used by children and adolescents in evaluating exclusion from activity-based peer groups who share interests (e.g., ballet, baseball). The role of group membership (gender and race) was introduced by asking children about the exclusion of an individual who did not fit the stereotypic expectations of the group (e.g.,
gender: excluding a boy from ballet, a girl from baseball; race: excluding a White student from basketball or a Black student from a math club) (Killen & Stangor, 2001). For straightforward exclusion decisions (e.g., “Is it all right or not all right to exclude a boy from a ballet club?”), the vast majority of 7-, 10-, and 13-year-olds evaluated such exclusionary acts as unfair and morally wrong. Shared interests were viewed as more important than stereotypic issues. When asked to make judgments in more complex, less explicit contexts, however, such as who the group should pick when only one space was available and two children wanted to join, one who matched the stereotype and one who did not (e.g., “A boy and girl both want to join ballet, who should the group pick?”), with age, participants focused on group functioning considerations and picked the child who fit the stereotype. Despite using moral reasoning to evaluate the straightforward exclusion vignette, the older sample used more social conventional reasoning than did their younger counterparts when picking a new group member in the inclusion/exclusion scenario. Thus, with age, adolescents’ awareness of group functioning considerations overrides their focus on fairness or equal opportunity, in certain contexts (Horn, 2003, 2006). These contexts usually involve situations when the only information one can rely on to make such a decision is group membership.

Findings from the same study showed that when children and adolescents were provided with information that both stereotypic and nonstereotypic targets were equally qualified to participate in the activity (e.g., both James and Sarah are good at ballet), children and adolescents picked the nonstereotypic child more often than the stereotypic one. Thus having access to individuating information served to alleviate reliance on social group categories to make decisions regarding inclusion and exclusion. Further evidence of such patterns exists in studies assessing exclusion based on membership in high school social reference groups (e.g., “Jimmy, who is a Goth, was not invited to join the student council”) (Horn, 2003). This research shows that once information beyond group membership was presented about the target of exclusion, whether positive or negative (e.g., involved or uninvolved in school), adolescents (14- and 16-year-olds) considered such individuating information with more weight than the target’s group membership (Horn, 2003). An interesting question for this research is the generalizability of this form of social exclusion in other cultural contexts, such as countries where social cliques do not take on the same status as in the United States.

In a series of innovative studies, Horn and colleagues (Horn, 2007, 2012; Horn & Szalacha, 2009) have examined how adolescents reason about
peer-based harassment stemming from sexual orientation and sexual identity. This is an issue that is pervasive across cultures, with different conflicting messages and an increasingly vocal majority of cultures condemning homophobia (within the second decade of the twenty-first century). The research findings provide evidence that both individual (e.g., age, religion, social identity) and contextual (e.g., school factors, peer group status, having a lesbian or gay friend) factors are related to adolescents reasoning about bias-based peer harassment. For example, in several studies reviewed in Horn (2012), older adolescents were more likely than younger adolescents to judge exclusion of a lesbian or gay peer to be wrong. In addition, older adolescents were more likely to base their judgments on moral reasoning while younger adolescents were more likely to make appeals to social convention (Horn, 2012). In another study, adolescents attending a school that had implemented safe schools practices (e.g. policies, professional development) evaluated exclusion as more wrong and used more moral reasoning in justifying their judgments than adolescents attending a school that had not implemented these practices (Horn & Szalacha, 2009). As with social exclusion, Horn’s (2012) research reveals that sexual prejudice is a multifaceted phenomenon. Adolescents are more likely to draw upon their moral concepts of fairness in making judgments about exclusion and teasing based on sexual orientation but also more likely to utilize conventional knowledge (e.g., social norms, religious rules) and informational assumptions (e.g., “homosexuality is unnatural”) in evaluating whether homosexuality is acceptable or wrong (Horn, 2012). This research reveals the complexity of an issue such as sexual identity, which reflects moral (fair treatment of others), conventional (views about homosexuality), and psychological (issues of personal jurisdiction) considerations.

Cultural messages are also particularly salient regarding religious affiliation. In a study testing the factors that contribute to social exclusion based on cultural identity, Brenick and Killen (2014) found that for Jewish American and non-Jewish American adolescents (14- and 17-year-olds), ethnicity-based exclusion was viewed as more justifiable in some contexts than others. The case of intergroup exclusion (an Arab peer excluding a Jewish peer or vice versa) was more justifiable if it occurred in the context of a cultural community event or that of someone’s home owing to parental discomfort than if it occurred in the context of a peer group activity such as going to the movies. Those who reported higher levels of identification with their culture or ethnicity were less inclusive than those who identified less with their culture or
ethnicity. Therefore, in addition to contextual variables, the extent to which an individual affiliates and identifies with his or her cultural in-group will influence exclusion judgments.

To examine what underlies judgments about groups with little cross-group contact, Hitti and Killen (2014) investigated non–Arab American adolescents’ views about shared interests within and between groups identified as Arab American or non–Arab American. Participants lived in a region of the United States where they experienced little contact with Arab American peers. The goal of the study was to determine whether stereotypic expectations about Arab groups (held by non–Arab Americans adolescents) contributed to adolescents’ (12- and 16-year-olds’) views about shared interests and inclusion decisions by adolescent peer groups. Participants (N = 199) were asked whether an Arab (or non–Arab American) peer group would prefer to include a new member who either (1) shared interests (hobbies) and was an out-group member (non–Arab American) or (2) did not share interests (had different hobbies) and was an in-group member (Arab American).

Results indicated that adolescents chose to rely on individual characteristics in judging inclusion into their own cultural group but relied on group membership characteristics in judging inclusion into a cultural out-group. That is, adolescents believed that their non–Arab American in-group would choose new members based on a match between individuals’ activity preferences and the activity preferences of the group, but the Arab American out-group would choose new members based on a match between individuals’ cultural group membership. This finding was more prevalent when groups expressed norms and values related to exclusivity (e.g., “my group likes those who are similar”) than norms related to inclusivity (e.g., “my group likes those who are different”). Therefore adolescents expected groups to have different inclusion criteria based on their affiliation with a cultural social category. This was not the case, though, when groups espoused inclusive norms that embraced differences.

Inclusive peer-group norms can also diminish the effects of stereotypes on adolescents’ inclusivity into their own groups. Findings from the same study indicated that those who made stereotypic associations with the Arab social category were less likely to include an Arab American peer into their exclusive group of friends than those who did not hold stereotypes. But this difference did not manifest when their group had an inclusive norm. Consequently adolescents factor in other group characteristics, such as group norms and values, in making intergroup exclusion and inclusion decisions.
3. Perceptions of Similarity Based on Group Membership

The data indicate that children and adolescents struggle with intergroup evaluations that have moral relevance when both individual and group characteristics are salient. A series of studies (Margie, Killen, Sinno, & McGlothlin; 2005; McGlothlin, Killen, & Edmonds; 2005) assessed the role of perceptual cues (e.g., skin color) as well as shared interests (e.g., both like to play soccer) on perceptions of intergroup and intragroup similarities and intergroup attitudes. In these studies, both minority and majority six- and nine-year-olds were administered an interracial ambiguous situation task in which a White or Black child was depicted as a potential transgressor. Participants’ interpretations of the cross-race interaction served as a measure of their implicit intergroup biases. A perception-of-similarity task was also administered, which varied not only the race of the pairs of peers represented but also the shared interest (e.g., they either like the same sport activity or not).

McGlothlin et al. (2005) reported that European Americans held intergroup biases in making judgments about cross-race friendships (which were judged to be unlikely) but not in rating perceptions of similarity. When cross-race dyads with shared interests were compared with those having different interests, children referred to shared interests more often than race in rating the similarity of the dyads. However, children evaluated a Black peer dyad that did not have similar interests as more similar than a White peer dyad with different interests. These findings showed support for the out-group homogeneity effect, suggesting that children as young as six and nine years of age view out-group members as similar to one another but recognize more heterogeneity among in-group members (Ryan, Judd, & Park, 1996).

Minority children’s responses to the same measures differed slightly. Margie et al. (2005) reported that minority children showed slight bias in attributing negative intentions to White protagonists in the ambiguous-situation task but showed no biases in making judgments about potential friendships. In addition, no evidence was found for the out-group homogeneity effect in this sample of minority children. As with the European American sample in the previous study, minority children focused on shared interest more so than on race or other physical cues in judging similarity. Unlike the European American sample, minority children focused on shared interest in judging potential for friendship between both different-race and similar-race dyads.
These findings show that children use both group characteristics related to racial affiliation and individual characteristics related to shared interest in activities to make social judgments about their peers. While similarities between minority and majority children in the United States were found indicating that shared interests in activities can often trump racial differences, majority European American children were more likely to struggle with differentiating out-group same-race dyads who did not share the same interest. Thus these studies provide further evidence that group membership can interfere with children’s perceptions of the diversity of out-groups.

4. Social Exclusion and Group Dynamics

Understanding group dynamics involves accumulating knowledge about how one’s own group functions and requires an understanding of what characterizes group cohesion (Abrams, Hogg, & Marques, 2005; Rutland, Killen, & Abrams, 2010). Group cohesion could rely on maintaining positive group identity by preserving the cultural identity of all those in the group. At times this could mean preserving similar membership in a meaningful social category (e.g., members of an American football team are all male) or preserving group norms that represent the beliefs and values which define the group (e.g., members of a capitalist political party all share the same belief in free enterprise and individual rights). When considering social exclusion, this understanding helps to determine whether social exclusion is acceptable in two contexts: (1) intragroup exclusion, which involves excluding members of one’s group because they do not adhere to group norms, and (2) intergroup exclusion (as discussed in the previous section). Thus children and adolescents make decisions about both forms of exclusion by coordinating what they know about their in-group norms with what they know about out-groups and the norms they adhere to.

While previous research has investigated such coordination between in-group and out-group norms in the context of preferences for in-group and out-group members who deviate or adhere to conventional group loyalty norms (Abrams & Rutland, 2008), current research assessed children’s (nine years) and adolescents’ (thirteen years) reasoning about exclusion and how they evaluate those who deviate from moral group norms. This series of studies examined both moral norms related to resource allocation and conventional norms related to clothing traditions (Hitti, Mulvey, Rutland, Abrams, & Killen, 2014; Killen, Rutland, Abrams, Mulvey, & Hitti, 2013; Mulvey, Hitti,
What is unique about these studies is that the moral norms reflect both group-specific and generic norms—that is, norms accepted and condoned by the larger culture and society. The generic norms identified and manipulated in the studies included moral norms (equal allocation of resources) and conventional norms (wearing an assigned group t-shirt to a school assembly). In addition, group-specific norms were included in the design. These group-specific norms were those that were unique to each peer group and were not consistent with larger generic norms. The group-specific moral norms were unequal allocation (more resources for the in-group) and the conventional norms were nontraditional behavior (not wearing the group t-shirt to the school assembly to be “cool”). The salient in-group and out-group social categories used were gender and school affiliation.

Previous findings suggest that children (six to eleven years of age) do not like in-group members who express disloyalty and deviate from conventional generic norms related to group loyalty, such as in-group members who do not cheer for the in-group during a competition (see Abrams & Rutland, 2008). Yet, the findings of Killen, et al. (2013) showed that both children and adolescents (N = 381, nine- and thirteen-year-olds) differentiated between deviance from generic norms that are socially acceptable and nongeneric group-specific norms that are condoned only by the group. When asked if they thought the deviant member was doing something that is acceptable, participants approved of those who deviated from group-specific norms in order to advocate for generic norms. As an example, when a group wanted to keep the resources for themselves (moral) or refuse to wear a group t-shirt (conventional), participants liked in-group deviants who espoused the generic norms (widely accepted) of equal resource allocation and traditional t-shirt wearing. What is unique and novel about this finding is that it provides an example in which children support in-group disloyalty. This has implications for children's and adolescents' capacities to recognize that compliance to group norms is not always desirable, especially when the group norms are selfish or disruptive.

To fully test this interpretation, children and adolescents were asked to evaluate the converse condition—that is, where an in-group member is advocating for selfish (more resources for us) or nontraditional behavior (not wearing a school t-shirt). In this context, children disliked the in-group deviant and were more negative toward an in-group deviant who advocated for inequality than for one who advocated for nontraditional behavior. Children
differentiated between two forms of deviance; one that is more closely aligned with civil disobedience (rejecting a group norm that is viewed as unfair) and one that challenges conventions (wearing the club shirt when the group does not). The conventional “disobedience” was not supported to the same degree because the norms about violating a convention was viewed, in some cases, as an act of autonomy or “being different,” in a manner that did not impinge on unfair treatment of others. Fundamentally, children and adolescents distinguished group-level norms (what an individual group decides to do) and generic-level norms (those norms held by the larger society).

Even children as young as age four differentiate generic-level norms from group-specific norms (see Figure 4-2) (Cooley & Killen, in press). Children from three to six years of age distinguished between generic norms that were morally relevant (allocating resources equally) and those that were related to conventions (wearing a group-assigned sticker) as a modification of the method used by Killen et al. (2013). Younger children were more disapproving of an unequal deviant (someone who advocated for more resources for the in-group) than were adolescents because adolescents were able to recognize the benefits to the group that would come from having a member in support of giving the group more resources.

Yet the question remains whether, despite their disapproval of nonconforming members who espouse unequal and nontraditional norms, children are willing to exclude them. In another study (Hitti et al. 2014) nine- and thirteen-year-olds viewed the exclusion of both unequal and nontraditional deviants as more acceptable than the exclusion of a deviant who espoused equal distribution of resources and following traditions. While they still judged exclusion of in-group members as wrong, by referencing the unfairness of exclusion (e.g. “It’s not fair to kick him out”), findings indicate that in-group members who deviate from moral group norms are at risk of being excluded more than those who deviate from other types of norms.

Despite the weight that children place on group norms, the type of group membership also matters. Differences between intergroup contexts (when groups were defined by gender and school) were found in another study by Mulvey et al. (2014a). These findings indicated that, in a school context where school affiliation is made salient (e.g., your school versus my school), participants were less likely to include someone of a different school than someone from a different gender when that person shared their traditional in-group norm or their nontraditional in-group norm. This finding could be explained by children’s hesitation to include someone from a different school whom they
may not be familiar with; thus there may be times when cultural categories could invite exclusion owing to unfamiliarity with that specific culture.

Unfamiliarity with another group could lead to attribution and intergroup biases in judging how out-groups might behave and in evaluating the acts and behaviors of cultural out-groups (Hitti & Killen, 2014). What we can also take away from the series of findings regarding deviance from different norms is that children and adolescents have varying levels of tolerance for violations of different norms, and these differ depending on whether a norm is moral versus conventional or generic versus group-specific.

In the Netherlands, which has seen increasing tensions between Muslim migrants and Dutch nationals, research assessing adolescents’ tolerance for Muslim practices supports these findings (Gieling, Thjis, & Verkuyten, 2010). Twelve to seventeen-year-olds were asked to evaluate whether certain Muslim practices were tolerated. The different practices or norms reflected moral issues (e.g., an imam speaking out against homosexuality), conventional issues (e.g., founding an Islamic school and not shaking hands with people of the opposite sex), or personal choices (e.g., wearing a head scarf). Muslim practices that were viewed as personal choices were tolerated the most, followed by those viewed as conventional; those viewed as violations of moral norms were tolerated the least. However, tolerance decreased with age and was endorsed less by those who did not identify with a multicultural ideology. This indicates that while, overall, adolescents do differentiate among various cultural practices and norms, both developmental and individual differences that impact their perceptions or willingness to accept cultural norms of religious out-groups do exist.

![Figure 4-2: Age effect for group versus individual evaluations of equal-allocating deviant member. (From Cooley, S., & Killen, M. [in press]. Young children’s evaluations of resource allocation in the context of group dynamics.)](image)
Examining one’s own perspective in congruence with expectations about groups is important for our understanding of how children are able to navigate between their group affiliations and who they are as individuals. Therefore, within the context of studying their understanding of group dynamics, children’s own individual perspectives are measured. Differences between how one might expect a group to behave and their own individual point of view represent a cognitive ability known as theory of social mind (see Abrams, Rutland, Pelletier, & Ferrell, 2009), which is an understanding that groups have beliefs, interests, and goals that may be different from one’s own. This ability is acquired with age as children gain more experience with groups and are able to navigate between their own autonomy as individuals and their identities within peer groups.

Research has shown that, within an intragroup context, in evaluating deviance from groups, four- and five-year-olds have difficulty differentiating between judgments about groups and their own preferences about members who deviate from group norms. This is especially the case for violations of moral norms related to the equal distribution of resources (Cooley & Killen, in press). However, by age six they begin to demonstrate the ability to differentiate between group expectations about a deviant member and their own individual judgments about the same member.

The findings indicate that at ages nine and thirteen years children and adolescents clearly differentiate between their own perspectives and their group expectations; but nine-year-olds still struggle with this in the moral context when a deviant member espouses unequal resource distribution and the group does not (Killen et al., 2013). In this case nine-year-olds’ strong preference for strict equality, which has been documented by many researchers (Almas, Cappelen, Sorensen, & Tungodon, 2010; Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008) overwhelms their ability to make the distinction. This is not the case for 13-year-olds, as they seem to recognize that—despite the moral implications of unequal resource distribution (which they themselves do not prefer)—a group may sometimes favor someone who advocates for more resources even though it is in defiance of group norms (Mulvey et al., 2014b).

Therefore, as adolescents become more autonomous (Daddis, 2011), they acquire greater skills in coordinating their own opinions and beliefs with what they expect of groups. These findings are reflected in both decisions about including deviants (Killen et al., 2013) and how favorable participants are toward deviant members (Mulvey et al., 2014b). In addition, similar patterns of adolescents’ differentiation between group and individual perspectives
have been found in studies assessing inclusion of cultural in-group and out-group members (Hitti & Killen, 2014). These findings show that adolescents expect groups to be less inclusive toward both cultural in-group and out-groups member than they themselves would be, especially in making judgments about including a cultural in-group target who does not share the same interests as the group.

We highlight these findings because they provide evidence for how children begin to develop identities that, although can be influenced by their in-group norms and beliefs, are also distinct from them. This is especially the case in instances involving harm to others, such as unequal resource distribution and excluding an in-group member. In such instances, younger children’s focus on avoiding harm may overwhelm their judgments about how groups behave. Adolescents, on the other hand, can firmly assert that groups may behave in their own interests at the expense of harming others. Additionally, adolescents are able to express that they themselves do not condone such behavior, thus demonstrating a developing ability to consider the complex issue of balancing between one’s own convictions and their in-group’s interests, which is often difficult even in adulthood.

V. SOCIAL INEQUALITIES AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION

The effort to elucidate normative age-related and contextual changes in individuals’ decisions about resource allocation has long been a focus of research in moral development (Damon, 1975, 1980; Enright et al., 1984; Kohlberg, 1969; Nucci, 2001; Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991). Decisions about resource allocation are common and relevant on many levels, from everyday decisions about dividing snacks between preschoolers to dividing work responsibilities between adult colleagues. On the national level, resource allocation decisions are explicitly implicated in institutional and governmental policy and practice with regard to distribution and access to important goods and services. When access to or the availability of resources—such as high-quality education, health care, and governmental assistance programs—is at stake, individuals and groups must make complex decisions about how these should (or could) be allocated. Research has established that judgments regarding resource distribution consistently involve moral questions of fairness, equality, and justice (Helwig & Turiel, 2002; Turiel, 1983, 1998).
A central concern pertaining to resource allocation has to do with the social inequalities that result from unfair allocation (Sen, 2009). Although humans value fairness, equality, and justice in allocating resources, the current distribution of vital resources in society highlights the disparity between our ideals and the lived reality of children and adults. While the human interest in cooperation, prosocial action, and moral decision making for the benefit of the whole group promotes an interconnected society, cultural definitions of what (or who) constitutes the “group” frequently result in differential treatment of out-group members by individuals or groups in positions of power or authority. Societal hierarchies promote the establishment and maintenance of resource inequalities. For example, the United States exhibits among the highest levels of economic inequality of any advanced industrial nation. Some estimates suggest that the richest 1% of Americans hold nearly 50% of the wealth (Norton & Ariely, 2011). Despite the country’s overall prosperity, approximately one in five children in the United States lives below the poverty line. The gap between rich and poor in the United States widens when family background is taken into account: 65% of African American children, 65% of Hispanic/Latino children, and 63% of American Indian children live in low-income families, whereas 31% of European American children and 32% of Asian American children live in low-income families (Addy, Engelhardt, & Skinner, 2013).

Wealth disparities, as measured by family income, are related to a host of pervasive resource inequalities that contribute to the increasing stratification of American society. For example, more than 60% of African American and Hispanic/Latino students attend high-poverty schools, versus 30% of Asian Americans and 18% of European Americans. These schools serve communities that are increasingly segregated by race and socioeconomic status, reflecting conditions of distress that perpetuate housing inadequacy, weak and failing public infrastructure, lack of mentors for students, and a shortage of jobs, all of which adversely affect children’s educational success (Orfield & Lee, 2005). These educational inequalities reflect and intensify the stratification of American society. In adulthood, Hispanics/Latinos and African Americans are paid less than their European American peers, and although gender disparities in the workforce have decreased in recent years, women are still paid less than men (Isaacs, Sawhill, & Haskins, 2008). While inequalities of income and wealth in the United States have been on the rise since the 1970s, opportunities for upward mobility, particularly for children born into low-income families, have declined (Isaacs, Sawhill & Haskins, 2008).
Thus, in investigating children’s and adults’ moral decisions about the fair allocation of important resources in an intergroup context, researchers must also examine cultural expectations, including the history of discrimination faced by groups ranked lower on the cultural status hierarchy and the residual effects of this on biases and stereotypes held by high-status groups (Appiah, 2005; Nussbaum, 1999; Sen, 2009). Much like the discussion of hierarchies, differential distribution and access to important societal resources on the basis of group membership is a form of social exclusion and a method for perpetuating status quo inequalities. While extensive developmental research has shown that children appreciate and articulate the importance of equality and dividing resources to ensure equal distribution (see Smetana, Jambon, & Ball, 2014), even in the child’s world these allocation decisions become increasingly complex when criteria such as culture, status, and merit are involved. By providing an overview of research on these topics, the following section addresses what developmental scientists have learned about the nature of morality and culture in children’s decisions about the allocation of resources.

1. Resource Allocation: Developmental Findings

Early developmental research in this area measured children’s reasoning about resource allocation, demonstrating that young children focused first on their own selfish desires (getting more of a desired resource for themselves) rather than on strict equality, with an increasing recognition of merit and effort with age (Damon, 1975). By age 10 years, children demonstrated an understanding of equity, which was conceptualized as a balance between equality and merit (Damon, 1975). These foundational studies led to a long line of research on sharing (dividing resources between oneself and another person) and resource allocation (dividing resources between two third-party recipients). Studies examined the cross-cultural generalizability of resource allocation decisions (to be described further on) but not the cultural messages about resource allocation or how the cultural group membership of the recipients played a role in children’s judgments, which would require a heterogeneous context for allocation decisions (such as distributing resources to in-group and out-group members), as we will elaborate.

Recent behavioral economics research on children’s resource allocation has focused on whether children distributed resources equitably or selfishly. The findings have revealed that, by nine years of age, children prefer strict
equality (Almas et al., 2010; Ferh, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008). These findings support earlier work on reasoning by providing behavioral evidence of equality preference. Conceptually, however, the expectation that children either prefer equality or inequality (advantaging the self) does not reflect the full range of children’s social cognitive capacities. Further, even with the strict equality findings, the interpretation is that it is in the service of selfish desires and that, with age, strict equality evolves into meritocracy, which is more advanced.

However, this framework creates a false dichotomy between the individual (selfish desires, or “more for me!”) and morality (equality), leaving out important nonmoral, nonselfish considerations such as group identity, group functioning, and group affiliation (attachment to groups). These other dimensions are motivating aspects of individuals’ resource allocation decisions. As reviewed earlier, inequality is not always “selfish”; achieving equality can be a complex decision, especially with competing needs in an intergroup context. For example, giving more resources to the in-group may reflect a group orientation rather than a selfish one. Thus we posit that an understanding of the psychological evaluations of resource allocation decisions involves the measurement of individual, group, and fairness reasoning as well as motivations. The following section examines the origins of the resource allocation decisions that promote fairness and justice, and those that perpetuate prejudice and discrimination.

Research with young children in homogenous cultural contexts has revealed a preference for equal distribution of small, temporary resources (e.g., candy, stickers) that is established as early as age three (Fehr et al., 2008; Warneken, Lohse, Melis, & Tomasello, 2011), and extends even to a preference among six- to eight-year-olds to discard a desirable resource in order to avoid unjustified unequal allocation (Shaw & Olson, 2011). In fact, humans desire equal allocation of these types of resources before they even have the motor skills to enact them; infants as young as 12 months (and more certainly infants between 15 and 18 months) have been shown to prefer looking at and reaching for agents who enact equal (versus unequal) distributions (Geraci & Surian, 2011; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011; Sommerville, Schmidt, Yun, & Burns, 2013). Young children’s early orientations include both fairness and equality.

With age, children are increasingly able to consider multiple perspectives or claims to a resource, and older children make allocation decisions that reflect sensitivity to equity principles of need and merit in addition to
equality principles (Damon, 1975; McCrink, Bloom, & Santos, 2010; Nucci, 2002; Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991). With age, children even object to an unjustified unequal distribution that is in their favor (LoBue, Nishida, Chiong, DeLoache, and Haidt (2011). Far from charting a simple trajectory, research is beginning to elaborate the extent to which young children can understand the fairness of a meritorious resource distribution versus the extent to which they prefer such distributions over strictly equal ones (Baumard, Mascaro, & Chevallier, 2012; Sloane, Baillargeon, & Premack, 2012). Developmental changes in resource allocation decisions have been reported even into late adolescence as fairness ideals grow to encompass allocations that rectify past inequalities or reward effort and deservedness (e.g., Güroğlu, van den Bos, & Crone, 2009).

2. Moral and Cultural Facets of Resource Allocation Decisions

Research has examined numerous factors related to resource allocator and resource recipient status in order to understand their impact on children's and adolescents' allocation decisions. On the local level, children generally allocate more resources to their friends and family members over strangers (McGillicuddy-De Lisi, Watkins, & Vinchur, 1994; Moore, 2009). This early understanding of resource allocations in group contexts and preferential treatment of in-group members extends to racial and ethnic groups as well as others. Early work by Zinser, Bailey, and Edgar (1976) revealed a preference among European American preschoolers for sharing candy with a member of their racial in-group rather than a member of a racial out-group (African American or Native American). Adding an additional layer of complexity, Zinser, Rich, and Bailey (1981) found that European American eight year-olds shared more candy with a racial in-group member described as poor than a racial out-group member (African American) described as poor, whereas ten-year-olds shared candy equally with either potential recipient. More recently, McGillicuddy-De Lisi, Daly, and Neal (2006) found a somewhat, opposite developmental trend such that European American 7- and 8-year-olds distributed a reward equally between an in-group story character and an out-group (African American) story character regardless of the characters’ differential effort toward a task, whereas nine- and ten-year-olds demonstrated a form of aversive racism, or lowered standards for effort, for the African American out-group relative to the European American
in-group. Nine- and ten-year-olds allocated more to a hardworking African American character than a hardworking European American character and more to a needy European American character than a needy African American character. The findings reveal that a surprisingly adult-like demonstration of aversive racism exists in ethnic majority nine- to ten-year-olds which may reflect internalized notions of race and merit. This is because an explicit racist viewpoint would be to deny any resources to a member of another group based on race. Instead, in McGillicuddy-DeLisi et al. (2006), older children lowered their standards for claims to a resource for African American students. More research is needed to understand the developmental trajectory of these two concepts as they relate to resource allocation.

Although the interpretation of the extant resource allocation research hinges on the societal status difference between study participants (European American children) and the potential recipients of the candy, coins, or other small resources used in these experiments, until recently children's allocations in light of actual societal resource inequalities were conspicuously absent from research focus. In the early 2000s, a small set of studies revealed results with much more positive implications than the clear evidence of in-group preference indicated by earlier work. Monteiro, de França, and Rodrigues (2009) explained existing inequalities in Portuguese society on the basis of race in six- to ten-year-old ethnic majority (White) children, and asked them to distribute coins between a White and a Black recipient. These children gave more coins to the Black recipient than the White recipient, demonstrating an interest in rectifying status quo social inequalities. In the United States, Olson, Dweck, Spelke, and Banaji (2011) found similar results with eight- to eleven-year-old ethnic majority (European American) children, who rectified an experimental inequality reflective of societal disparities by allocating more cookies to an African American recipient than to a European American recipient.

3. A Social Reasoning Developmental Approach to Social Inequalities

Research on resource allocation from a social reasoning developmental framework (Killen & Rutland, 2011; Rutland, Killen, & Abrams, 2010) has focused on two main areas. One branch of research has focused on children's decisions about the distribution of salient resources between culturally relevant in-groups and out-groups as well as their evaluations of in-group and
out-group members who advocate for equal and unequal distributions of resources between groups. Another branch of research has focused on children’s developing conceptions of fairness and justice, and reasoning about the distribution of salient resources to individuals and groups in the context of existing resource inequalities, as well as the role of resource type and cultural expectations about group status on children’s resource distributions and their developing affiliations with their social groups. This research has jointly examined moral developmental changes in children’s conceptions of fairness in resource allocation, social developmental changes in children’s evaluations of deviants from group norms and expectations about distributions based on group status, and social-cognitive changes in children’s reasoning about their decisions and evaluations in these everyday cultural contexts.

As described above, Cooley and Killen (in press) measured young children’s evaluations of in-group and out-group individuals who deviated from their groups’ norms about resource allocation preferences. The design of the study enabled the researchers to examine whether children can distinguish their own perspectives from the group norm in contexts in which an in-group member challenges the group norm (to be equal or unequal). Preschoolers ethnically representative of the US population (N = 73) evaluated a member of their classroom in-group (e.g., a peer from the “green room,” participants’ actual preschool classroom) who deviated from the classroom norm of equal or unequal allocation of blocks between themselves and the members of a neighboring classroom (e.g., the “blue room”). The context was very familiar to participants, and the resources in question (toy building blocks) were highly salient. Preschoolers (ages three to six years) negatively evaluated group members who deviated from their groups’ norm of equal block allocation by advocating for unequal allocation and provided reasons for their evaluations that pertained to fairness and equality. By contrast, they positively evaluated deviant actions that promoted equal allocations against the unequal norms of the group. Importantly, preschoolers had unfavorable views of members of their own group who espoused an unequal allocation even when it benefitted the group, demonstrating their priority for fairness over group norms.

With age, preschoolers began to differentiate their own evaluation of the deviant member from their expectations of the group’s favorability of the deviant member. Thus, while three- to four-year-olds and five- to six-year-olds both liked a deviant member who went against the unequal allocating group by being equal, only five- to six-year-olds thought that the group (which had an unequal allocation norm) would not like this deviant member because
they were going against the group norm (e.g., “they [the group] won’t like her because she isn’t doing the same things as them”). Three- to four-year-olds, however, generalized their favorability of the equal member to the group’s and thought the unequal group would like an equal deviant even though the member was going against the norm. These findings demonstrated developmental change occurring in early childhood regarding children’s understanding of group dynamics. Thus group-based expectations can work to promote or discourage moral decisions about resource allocation.

Using a similar design, Mulvey, Hitti, Rutland, Abrams and Killen (2014) examined in-group preferences in deciding to include a peer in two distinct intergroup contexts, gender and school affiliation, with an older age group. Children (9- to 10-year-olds) and adolescents (13- to 14-year-olds) chose between including someone in their group who shared their group norm (resource allocation norm or conventional norm) or a member who shared their group membership (school affiliation or gender). For example, in the gender context, if the participant was a female and in a group that divided resources equally (“female equal allocator”) she had to decide who should be included to her group: (1) another female who wanted unequal allocation of resources (gender in-group, different norm) or (2) a male who wanted the resources allocated equally (gender out-group, same norm).

In both group membership contexts (school affiliation or gender), with age, participants displayed a greater ability to balance information about in-group norms and group membership. Younger nine- to ten-year-olds were more likely to include an out-group member who supported equal norms than were adolescents. Additionally, in reasoning about their inclusion decision, children used more fairness reasoning (e.g., “they should pick him because he’s being fair”) than did adolescents. More references to group identity and group functioning reasoning were made in the school identification context than in the gender context. There were no differences for in-group preferences across the school and gender contexts when the group norms were about fair allocation of resources (moral norms). Desires for equal allocation of resources trumped differences related to in-group preference. These findings demonstrate the salience of context in the manifestation of in-group preference and the increasing sophistication, with age, of children’s and adolescents’ group decision-making skills.

Extending this work on young children’s developing understanding of fairness norms, Rizzo, Elenbaas, and Killen (2014) assessed allocation preferences in the context of existing resource inequalities. As previously mentioned, research
in this area is scarce, and previous work on this topic has primarily addressed allocations of small, temporary resources (e.g., cookies, coins), in order to highlight the salience of group membership, rather than resource value, for children’s allocation decisions. In a paradigm designed to capture children’s understanding of both recipients’ relative claims over a resource and the relative value of resources, Rizzo, et al., (2014) measured 3- to 8-year-olds’ allocations of resources described as necessary (needed to avoid illness and harm) or luxury (enjoyable to have, but not needed) to recipients who were either rich (had a lot of the resource) or poor (had none of the resource). With age, children allocated more resources to the poor recipient, demonstrating an interest in rectifying existing inequalities by giving more to disadvantaged individuals (see Figure 4-3).

Importantly, developmental differences were also found for children’s judgments of alternative allocation strategies (e.g., allocating according to strict equality or perpetuating the inequality). Children’s evaluations of alternative allocations shifted from a preference for equal allocations in three- to five-year-olds to a preference for allocations that gave more to the poor individual in six- to eight-year-olds. Analyses of children’s reasoning for their allocations revealed age-related changes, with younger children focusing on the individuals’ welfare and older children focusing on the importance of rectifying past inequalities. These findings suggest that children use unequal allocations (allocations that benefit a disadvantaged individual) to promote equality norms at a much younger age than previously anticipated and that

![Figure 4-3](image-url)

**FIGURE 4-3:** Proportion of children ages three to eight years who distributed more resources to a rich character, an equal amount, or more resources to a poor character. (From Rizzo, Elenbaas, Cooley, & Killen [in preparation]).
young children differentiate between and understand the relative importance of resources that are needed to avoid harm and those that are simply enjoyable to have.

Another part of this research on social inequalities has focused on children’s decisions and reasoning about the distribution of societal resources in the context of existing group-based inequalities. While Rizzo et al., (2014) focused on the important areas of competing claims and resource value, Elenbaas, Cooley, Rizzo, and Killen (2014) focused on the role of group status and identification with advantaged or disadvantaged groups when North American children evaluated social inequalities reflective of two of the actual inequalities in US society. In this study, 5- to 6- and 10- to 11-year-olds of African American and European American background were told about the unequal distribution of educational and medical supplies among schools and hospitals. In each instance, the schools were attended by either African American or European American children and the hospitals served either African Americans or European Americans. After hearing about a history of unequal distribution, participants allocated educational and medical supplies to two new schools and hospitals with the same racial affiliations and explained their reasoning for their decision. Finally, participants completed a task measuring their associations of societal status with the two racial groups portrayed as measured through job status and material possessions. The preliminary findings indicate that older children take disadvantaged histories into account but are more likely than not to give extra resources to groups that have been historically disadvantaged (e.g., African Americans enrolled in schools that were disadvantaged received more resources than European Americans enrolled in disadvantaged schools). This study was the first to assess resource allocation decisions and reasoning about actual societal inequalities in the United States and the first to directly relate children’s perceptions of racial group status with their allocation decisions.


As described above, cultural group membership impacts children’s and adolescents’ resource allocation decisions on a number of levels, from classroom affiliation to racial group membership. Researchers have extended this line of inquiry to the level of national group membership, with results that point to both generalizable developmental trends and culturally specific
resource allocation decisions. Early cross-national work in the United States and Sweden by Enright et al. (1984) found that, with increasing age, children’s reasoning about resource allocation progressed from a focus on strict equality to consideration of needs and merit in allocating rewards to story characters, with no significant differences observed between the reasoning of children in Sweden and that of those in the United States. Likewise, recent work with five-year-old Turkana children in Kenya revealed an interest in taking individual contribution into account in allocating a resource that was jointly produced by story characters (Liénard, Chevallier, Mascaro, Kiura, & Baumard, 2013), paralleling findings by Baumard et al. (2012) with middle-income French children. Another study, by Carson and Banuazizi (2008), found that in distributing resources to those who needed them but did not earn them (i.e., need-based) as opposed to those who earned them but did not need them (i.e., merit-based), both North American and Filipino children preferred equal distribution of resources despite their different cultural orientations (e.g., Filipino culture being associated with collectivistic orientation). However, Filipino children chose to allocate resources to those in need more often than did North American children, while North American children chose to allocate resources to those who worked hard.

Studies in which participants themselves are potential recipients of resources have also found cross-national similarities in allocation patterns. Rochat et al. (2009) explored children’s distributions of small collections of desirable goods between themselves and an experimenter and between two dolls. On average, 3- to 5-year-olds in seven highly contrasted cultural environments (rural and urban environments in China, Peru, Fiji, the United States, and three distinct urban sites in Brazil) tended to allocate the first resource and the most valuable resource to themselves, but by age 5, demonstrated more fairness in sharing behavior. Children growing up in the small-scale urban and traditional societies showed a smaller magnitude of self-interest than children growing up in other environments. Other research comparing Brazilian and European American 3- to 11-year-olds found that, with age, Brazilian children showed a preference for equal distributions of tokens between themselves and a peer, while European American children showed an increasing preference for allocations that benefitted themselves over a peer (Carlo, Roesch, Knight, & Koller, 2001). This mixture of findings indicates that more research is needed to compare methodologies across cultural context and to examine the conditions for resources, such as luxury or necessary ones, and the claims to resources. The case of sharing and resource
allocation is a rich context for examining the interplay of morality and culture throughout development.

Decisions about resource allocation are implicated in the everyday interactions of children’s friend groups as well as the deliberations of national policymakers. These judgments, decisions, and evaluations consistently involve moral questions of fairness, justice, and equality and cultural questions of history, group membership, and norms. Although the myriad of different group memberships that children hold emphasize the status of their in-group relative to out-groups, cross-national studies point to more similarities than differences in the ways that children around the world choose to allocate limited resources. While social hierarchies promote differential distribution and access to important resources on the basis of group membership, there is ample evidence that children and adolescents understand and value equality and increasing evidence that, with age, they can overcome in-group bias and personally favor allocations that benefit historically disadvantaged groups within a culture, even if it means that their own group would receive a smaller share of a valued resource. Research on the origins and development of resource allocation as a moral and cultural decision has led to the conclusion that both play vital roles as children leverage their experience as members of social groups to make fair decisions.

VI. REDUCING INTERCULTURAL AND INTERGROUP PREJUDICE AND ENHANCING MORAL JUDGMENTS

The broader impact of the research described in this review is to reduce prejudice and bias in intercultural and intergroup contexts in childhood and promote moral decision making based on fairness, justice, and equality before negative attitudes, stereotypes, and biases become deeply entrenched. In addition to application of the research findings to intervention programs and curricula content, however, basic research has also been conducted on the factors that contribute to positive intercultural and intergroup relationships. These lines of research stem primarily from an area of work that originated in social psychology and has now been examined more broadly in developmental and educational psychology, which pertains to intergroup contact. Allport’s contact hypothesis (1954) proposed that interaction with individuals from out-groups has the potential to reduce prejudice when certain conditions are met. These conditions included equal status, common goals,
institutional and authority support for the goals of equality, and cross-group friendships. The last criterion, out-group friendships, has generated the most research in both social and developmental psychology; here we highlight a few key findings and also expand the definitions of the criteria.

In addition, new lines of basic research on how to promote positive intercultural and intergroup relationships have been demonstrated through several avenues, including the effectiveness of multicultural education regarding intercultural attitudes and relationships (Verkuyten, 2008; Verkuyten & Brug, 2004), the use of moral reasoning and social cognitive competencies for recognizing the unfairness of exclusion, stereotyping, and bias (Horn, 2007; Killen & Rutland, 2011), the nature of parental socialization strategies regarding prejudice (Pahlke, Bigler, & Suizzo, 2012), and the teaching curricula on the history of racism and bias (Hughes, Bigler, & Levy, 2007; Levy, et al., 2005). These studies have empirically tested different factors related to positive intercultural relationships and have identified variables that warrant future research. Developmental research is uniquely positioned to document the points in development that are amenable to change and to clarify how change comes about.

Regarding developmental research on intergroup contact, the findings have been quite promising when the conditions for contact are highly salient. While intergroup contact theory has been debated in the literature (see Killen, Mulvey, Hitti, & Rutland, 2012), the evidence for the effectiveness of cross-group friendships in reducing bias in intercultural contexts has been robust in the developmental literature.

Cross-group friendships have been found to create ideal conditions for significant reduction of prejudice in terms of perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors, including prejudice in childhood (Aboud & Levy, 2000; Aboud, Mendelson, & Purdy, 2003; Davies, Tropp, Aron, Pettigrew, & Wright, 2011; Feddes, Noack, & Rutland, 2009; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Turner, Hewstone, & Voci, 2007; White et al., 2009). A recent study of nine- to ten-year olds’ friendships demonstrated that more cross-race/ethnic friendships were associated with decreases in relational victimization and increases in peer support (beyond the contribution of same-race friendships to these variables), indicating that cross-race/ethnic friendships are beneficial for both majority-group and minority-group children (Kawabata & Crick, 2011).

Given that social exclusion of immigrant children by cultural majority children clearly occurs but is deemed unacceptable by most native-status
children, the factors that contribute to the reduction of such instances of social exclusion has been investigated. Research has demonstrated that cross-ethnic friendships result in higher levels of social competence, reduced explicit prejudice, and even improved academic motivation and performance. However, compared with same-ethnic friendships, cross-ethnic friendships are relatively infrequent, less stable, and tend to decline with age.

To examine the basis for the decreased in cross-group friendships, Jugert, Noack, and Rutland (2011) investigated the potential for friendship in multiethnic environments to determine actual reported mutual friendships between native German and Turkish preadolescents (mean age: 10 years) during their first year in an ethnically heterogeneous school. Turkish people have been immigrating to Germany since the early 1960s, and comprise about 3% of the total population. This group faces high levels of discrimination and rejection and holds considerably lower status in terms of education, health, and employment compared with ethnic Germans. Turkish children also perform worse in school than their German peers, which puts them at risk for dropout and limits their employment opportunities. Participants in this study completed questionnaires at the beginning, middle, and end of the school year. Among both German and Turkish children, preference for same-ethnic friendships decreased over time. Variability in friendships was predicted by in-group preference norms for German children and, over time, classroom identification increasingly reduced preference for same-ethnic friendships among Turkish children. These results highlight the potential for group norms to impact children’s friendship choices beyond and perhaps in spite of the influence of larger societal systems.

Further evidence for this possibility is provided by work by Abrams, Rutland, Pelletier, and Ferrell (2009), who studied six- to eleven-year-old British children’s evaluations of peer soccer fans during the 2004 European Championship Soccer Finals, in which the English and French teams were competing in the same section of the tournament. Participants heard about British or French peers who either cheered for only their own team or cheered for both the British and French teams and predicted the likelihood that that a peer would be accepted by his or her group and rejected by the opposing group or rejected by his or her group and accepted by the opposing group. Children who expected differential acceptance/rejection based on the target’s behavior explained their answers in terms of expectations about group norms and group functioning, and this tendency increased with age. Furthermore, the number of different groups that children belonged to (an index of peer-group experience) also predicted understanding of intergroup exclusion/inclusion.
norms. These results provide evidence of increasing understanding of group dynamics with age that could be applied to the context of exclusion on the basis of immigrant status.

In the United States, there is a unique set of stereotypes, immigration histories, and intergroup attitudes that make the Latino American population unique, including, among many variables, the extensive within-group heterogeneity (e.g., Latinos include many different nationalities, religions, and cultures, such as individuals who identify as Mexican, Cuban, Colombian, Puerto Rican, and so forth). Some studies have examined the role of intergroup contact and friendship in promoting intergroup attitudes (e.g., Killen, 2007a; Page-Gould, Mendoza-Denton, & Tropp, 2008; Ruck, Park, Killen, & Crystal, 2011). Consistent with and expanding upon the Allport’s (1954a) contact hypothesis, researchers have found that increased intergroup friendships and intergroup contact in school not only improve children’s intergroup studies but also decrease their use of stereotypes and increase their use of moral reasoning to justify the wrongfulness of intergroup social exclusion.

Examining Latino Americans in particular, Ellison, Shin, and Leal (2011) found that close and sustained friendships with Latinos were associated with a broad array of attitudinal outcomes, including stereotyping, respect for the contributions of Latinos, social and cultural distance, and even views on immigration policy. Much like developmental intergroup researchers, Ellison et al. (2011) posited that while intergroup contact has been measured in several different ways, it is important to compare the effects on attitudes. Although the study was conducted among adults, findings have implications for developmental models, as the weight of the evidence underscores the importance of friendships. However, few studies make a distinction between close friendships and acquaintances. The authors also point to intergroup relations among ethnic minority groups. In their study, African Americans were likely to have biases against Latinos.

This research is a salient and unique demonstration of the factors that reduce prejudice in intercultural contexts. Much more research should be conducted to examine the role of cross-group friendships on the plurality of resource allocation as well as social exclusion. The initial conditions of the contact hypothesis focused primarily on the possibilities for overcoming stereotyping, prejudice, and hostility toward out-groups, especially racial and ethnic minorities (Allport, 1954a). Yet in viewing attitudes in the adult literature, a broader set of attitudes such as perceptions of wealth, status, and race-related policy preferences can become effective markers of intergroup
relations and biases. It is important to know whether various types of contact are linked with more favorable group-focused attitudes, such as reduced acceptance of negative stereotypes, less concern for social distance, and greater respect for out-group members.

VII. FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND CONCLUSION

Developmental research provides a window into the origins, acquisition processes, nature of change, and sources of influence on fundamental social competencies and capacities that structure social life and enable individuals to live in (relative) harmony. Culture provides a source of group identity and belongingness. Culture also generates identities that foster in-group and out-group, prejudice, bias, and social exclusion. In this chapter we have reviewed a research program that has been devoted to investigating how early cultural identifications as well as early moral orientations reflect both a synchrony and a clash of values. While much has been revealed, much is left to be done to understand the intersections of morality, development, and culture. First, the different histories and political hierarchies of cultures and cultural identities have not yet been factored into the experimental research programs in developmental research. The paradigms have included minimal groups, ad hoc groups, and those based on gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and religion. Each of these groups has a unique history and there needs to be a way to bring this information into the experimental designs of research projects. This would help to explain why, for example, in some studies US children view gender exclusion as less wrong than racial exclusion. The generalizability of this finding should be tested in cultures with very different expectations about gender from the United States (such as Saudi Arabia). This would shed light on whether a particular cultural category is deemed more or less wrong as a target of exclusion or a denial of resources owing to human social life and evolution or because of the political, social, and economic policies of a given culture.

Second, more developmental research using the same methodologies in different cultural contexts needs to be conducted. The recent effort to examine intergroup attitudes of children in a wide array of cultural contexts beyond the United States and Europe has expanded the field in important ways, contributing to the understanding of the generalizability and cultural specificity of prejudice in childhood. However, too few studies in the varying cultural context have applied multiple measures to examine intergroup attitudes or to study different facets of bias and prejudice. Prejudice is a multidimensional phenomenon; therefore research should include different types
of assessments, including both implicit and explicit bias, ratings of perceived similarity as well as explicit stereotypes, and social reasoning about exclusion along with aversive racism measures. These measures would allow for more a more nuanced understanding of how children negotiate these issues in their peer worlds and how social context informs their attitudes and evaluations. Moreover, studies need to examine the role of adult-child interactions and peer relationships along with the roles of group and ethnic identity and intergroup contact.

Furthermore, research methods for measuring morality, intergroup attitudes, and cultural group membership are extremely heterogeneous, and it is very difficult to understand patterns of social evaluation, decision-making, and reasoning across a wide range of cultures without commensurable assessments. Finally, psychological interpretations, attitudes, and judgments reflect a range of explicit and implicit dimensions that all contribute to our understanding of social development. Explicit and implicit measures reveal different aspects of social interpretations of everyday social interactions, thus providing a full picture of development.

In sum, an understanding of age-related changes in childhood regarding complex moral and social phenomena is essential for understanding adulthood. Current research approaches the human psychological state from a prospective approach, documenting and investigating the evolution of a social orientation from one-word utterances to philosophical treatises. To understand and address the issues of cultural conflict, prejudice, and social exclusion, it is necessary to understand and intervene before the deeply entrenched attitudes of adulthood develop. Childhood is the time to make a change, when judgments are forming, labile, and evolving. To improve society it is essential to understand both morality and group affiliations and to examine the interplay of cultural and moral norms where it begins: in childhood.

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